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Resumo – A construção de “existe” como um predicado de primeira-
ordem ou real é defendida contra a ortodoxia prevalente.
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AbsTRAcT – The construal of ‘exists’ as a first-order or real predicate 
is defended against prevailing orthodoxy.
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Russell held that existence, in the only sense of that word which 
matters to logic, is not a “real” predicate – that nothing, I mean no thing, 
can possibly have the property of existing. As he puts it, ‘to say that A 
exists means that A is a class which has at least one member’ (Russell, 
1905: 486): existential statements, taken extensionally, are statements 
about classes (about their being empty or otherwise); in the intensional 
idiom of Principia Mathematica, they are statements about propositional 
functions (about their satisfaction). what they never are is plain, first-
order, statements about things. And, of course, in all such matters Russell 
was, on the face of it, following a venerable tradition, which goes back 
at least to Kant’s criticism of the ontological Argument and may have 
reached its highest point, with respect to clarity of both purpose and 
method at any rate, in Frege’s Grundlagen der Arithmetik.
For all that, when fifty-some years past the publication of ‘on denoting’ 
saul Kripke introduced model-theoretic semantics for normal modal 
systems, it came out as perfectly natural for him to have a first-order 
predicate ‘exists’. In the kind of logical systems envisaged by Kripke, 
we may as well express the statement that A is a non-empty class (i.e. 
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that ∃x x∈A), or that the propositional function F is satisfied by at least 
one individual (∃x Fx), as the statement that a particular individual, say 
George w. bush, exists. The latter we may write, to keep in view the 
difference in order levels, thus: Eb (see, e.g., Kripke 1963).
on the face of it, here is a plain question worth pondering: how did 
Kripke manage to find natural and non-problematic that which Kant 
and Frege (and Russell and carnap and eventually everybody) had 
taught us to reject as nonsense? what happened, as it were, in the   
meantime?
A glance at the line of descent which comes from the Theory of 
descriptions down to the doctrine of rigid designation will provide part of 
what I need to answer (or anyway, to submit an answer to) that question. 
An examination of some differences between the referents of Russellian 
proper names and those of Kripkean rigid designators will complete 
the materials out of which I will sketch my modest defense (well, call it 
defense) of Russell.
begin at the beginning, said the King to the white Rabbit. Now the 
beginning in philosophy is where we find ourselves, and that is usually 
some confusion or other, not always of a benign character. To such 
confusions the history of philosophical ideas is no more immune than 
are those ideas themselves. witness the set of ideas we are now used 
to associate with such lingo as ‘direct reference’, ‘rigid designation’, 
‘de re modalities’ and the like. They are usually – and, I hasten to add, 
overall rightly – associated with the names of some authors who made 
their appearance on the philosophical scene in the 1960s, like Kripke 
or donnellan; yet their origins are demonstrably traceable to Russell’s 
philosophy – more specifically, to the role played by Russell’s ideas in 
the dispute raised by Quine about the interpretation of quantified modal 
logic.
Quine held that modal contexts violate the leibnizian principle of 
substitutivity of Identity (cf. Quine 1943, 1947). In their replies to Quine, 
Arthur smullyan (1947, 1948) and Frederick Fitch (1948) countered that 
the criticism made tabula rasa of the distinction between names and 
descriptions. To be sure, co-extensive descriptions are not exchangeable 
in modal contexts: even if the man who denounced catiline is actually 
the same man who wrote the Tusculans, it remains true that the man 
who denounced catiline might not have written the Tusculans: after all, 
cicero might not have done any or both of these. yet, as both smullyan 
and Fitch stressed, cicero could not have failed to be Cicero, the particular 
man he actually was – even though, to be sure, he might not have been 
named ‘cicero’. Proper names, in a word, are not descriptions – and 
descriptions are not genuine singular terms but rather (as indeed Russell P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
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had shown) incomplete symbols. And, unlike descriptions, co-referential 
proper names are exchangeable in modal contexts. so long, then, as we 
keep in view the distinction between names and descriptions, in the 
spirit of Russell’s Theory of descriptions, modal contexts cease to look 
referentially opaque, as Quine held them to (inveterately) be.1
The idea provided a key to the interpretation of a result obtained by 
Ruth barcan (since marcus) in 1947. she proved (for a quantificational 
extension of lewis’s system s4), that for every x and y, if x = y, then 
necessarily x = y.2 That result, to be sure, is of no immediate consequence 
whatsoever for proper names or other kinds of singular terms in ordinary 
language: marcus’s proof concerns the admissible values of bindable first-
order variables in her system. It nevertheless strongly suggests a picture 
of such variables as being (relative to each value assignment, anyway) 
exemplars of the kind of terms Kripke would call ‘rigid designators’. And 
it is an extension of that view which would eventuate, ten years after, 
in the main thesis of what is nowadays often called the “New Theory of 
Reference”: that genuine singular terms are rigid designators.3
That being said, the most interesting feature of smullyan’s and Fitch’s 
arguments is not the use of Russell’s technique of incomplete symbols, 
but the fact of their assuming, against both Quine and Russell, that there 
is after all a non-empty class of genuine singular terms which, as scott 
soames puts it, behave exactly like Russellian logically proper names, 
except that their referents are not restricted to objects of Russellian 
acquaintance (cf. soames 1995: 196).
my opening question may at this point be rephrased thus: what does 
it take to assume that there is such a non-empty class of genuine singular 
terms, sharing with Russellian proper names their logical properties yet 
able to refer to entities we are not – and, in Russell’s very strict sense, 
cannot possibly ever be – acquainted with?
It’s in the answer to that question, I think, that the key is to be found 
to understand why it is not after all any less natural to say, of the referent 
of a Russellian logically proper name, that its taking the argument-place   
 
1  At the end of the day, all that Quine managed to show was that descriptions cannot 
be exchanged salva veritate in modal contexts. From which, however, nothing at all 
follows for singular terms, precisely because descriptions are not singular terms.
2  see [Marcus] 1947. All that the proof requires, in addition to the leibnizian principle 
of substitutivity of Identity, is the truism that every object is necessarily identical to 
itself. see the remarks by marcus in her 1961 and by Kripke in 1971.
3  I mean, in particular, Kripke’s modal argument, which hinges on the truth assignments of 
sentences containing no modal operators in different counterfactual situations (“possible 
worlds”) – as in the famous example featuring Nixon, the man who won the 1968 Presidential 
elections in the u.s.A.: it is Nixon we are talking of when we stipulate the situation in which, 
contrary to what actually happened, he would have lost the elections: see Kripke 1980: 40-49.P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
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of the function x exists results in a tautology (and that, correspondingly,   
a contradiction is the outcome of its taking the argument-place in x does 
not exist) than it is to ask, of the referent of Kripkean rigid designator – 
say, to begin with, of an ordinary proper name   – whether it exists, still 
exists, has ever existed, will go on existing.
It’s very deliberately that I bring these verbal tenses into the picture. 
For what at the end of the day will make all the difference is the way 
we think of the relations between existence and time. or so, anyway, I 
will argue.
by the end of the 1970s the “New Theory of Reference” had gained 
wide acceptance, and Quine’s protests against “Aristotelian essentialism” 
were beginning to sound like relics of bygone days in the history of 
analytic philosophy. That was when dagfinn Føllesdal sketched, as part 
of an attempt at a critical evaluation of the story I have just so hastily 
abridged, something which it would not be wholly improper to call a 
deduction (in the Kantian sense of that word) of the need for singular 
terms.4 Føllesdal’s starting point is the very general notion of an object, 
and of the world as consisting of objects some of which, at least, are apt 
to undergo change. Three features of that notion come to the forefront as 
crucial for the understanding of singular reference:
(1) objects, in husserl’s phrase, transcend our knowledge: they have 
properties which we do not know, which we are likely never to 
know; yet our ignorance does not debar us from thinking and 
speaking of these imperfectly known objects.
(2) objects (with the exception of mathematical and other abstract 
objects, whatever there may be) change: they acquire and lose 
properties in the course of time, all the while preserving their 
identities – which is what enables us to keep thinking of them, 
recognizing them in successive encounters, tracking them through 
the changes they undergo.
(3) last yet not least, we are fallible: we have false beliefs, which we 
seek to correct; yet all along the process of revision, our changing 
beliefs keep being about the same objects (else there would be 
no point in saying that we changed our minds: we would rather 
have changed the subject, as when you move from wondering 
what blowup algebras are about to recalling the final scene of 
Antonioni’s Blowup).5
4  Føllesdal’s proposal is apposite here, it will be seen, for the light it sheds (by way 
of similarities as much as of dissimilarities, as wittgenstein would say) on Russell’s 
conception of an individual.
5  Føllesdal 1986: 107-109. (The trite example is my own embellishment.)P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
  Veritas, v. 55, n. 2, maio/ago. 2010, p. 32-41  37
The “deduction” culminates in the conclusion one would have 
expected: a language apt to express thoughts about objects which   
(1) transcend our knowledge, (2) undergo change, and (3) are such that 
we are often mistaken about them must contain a category of expressions 
apt to “hook onto” their objects and abide with them through time and 
its accidents. singular terms, in other words, allow us to track objects 
through changes, in the objects themselves as in our epistemic situation 
with respect to them.6
And that is how it comes out so natural (as natural it is, indeed) 
to predicate existence of an object. wherever there is time, wherever 
there is change, wherever there is generation and corruption, it is 
perfectly sensible to ask of an object whether it exists, has existed, 
keeps existing, can exist. Recall the Kripkean characterization of rigidity: 
a term t is the rigid designator of an object a if and only if t designates 
a in all possible worlds in which a exists (if it exists at all), and no other 
object in any possible world. (why is it that sherlock holmes could not 
possibly have existed? because the name ‘sherlock holmes’, as we use 
it, fails to designate anything in the actual world and, being rigidly used, 
designates nothing in every possible world. It is for the very same reason, 
let me add in passing, that there could not be such things as unicorns; 
their existence is just an impossibility – but maybe unicorns we better 
leave for another time.7)
I have argued that two conditions must be met for existence to 
behave as a real (or, if you like, a first-order) predicate. First, we must be 
in a position to genuinely name objects, as opposed to designate them 
by description;8 for if we were only able to think of objects under some 
description or other, existence could only be a “logical” predicate in Kant’s   
 
6  In a more detailed account I would take some space here to argue for the (nowadays 
pretty unoriginal, yet fiercely resisted in many quarters) claim that singular reference, 
hence the semantics of singular terms, is parasitic upon singular thought – that it is, in 
other words, our capacity to single out objects in thought which underlies the linguistic 
phenomenon of singular reference, and not the other way round. The recovery for 
analytic philosophy of the priority of thought over language, after over half a century 
of linguistic philosophizing, dates back to the early 1980s; the posthumous publication 
of Gareth evans’s book The Varieties of Reference (1982) can be fairly described as its 
cornerstone. yet bad ideas die hard. I hope to elaborate on the allure of “logocentrism” 
elsewhere.
7  Although I cannot resist calling attention to the best philosophical discussion of the 
topic that I know of (even if there is much in it which I am not prepared to endorse), 
dummett 1983.
8  Russell is as clear-sighted as one might wish about the difference; see, e.g., his informal 
presentation of the criterion for a term to qualify as a (logically) proper name: ‘whenever 
the grammatical subject of a proposition can be supposed not to exist without rendering 
the proposition meaningless, it is plain that the grammatical subject is not a proper 
name, i.e., not a name directly representing some object.’ (whitehead & Russell 1910: 66).P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
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sense, rather than a real one. second, there must nameable objects; and 
I have just hinted at what that implies.
Now all that story about time and change and cognition is, to be 
sure, wholly absent from the ostensible framework of the Theory of 
descriptions, although, and here is something I make a point of stressing, 
not in the least foreign to Russell’s thinking – witness ‘The existential 
Import of Propositions’ (Russell 1905). There Russell speaks of a sense 
of ‘exists’ which is to be found ‘in philosophy and ordinary language’, 
and contrasts it to another, which he calls ‘purely technical’ and claims 
(justifiably enough at the time he was writing) to be the only one in which 
that notion occurs in ‘symbolic logic’. In that latter sense, ‘A exists’ is 
to be understood as ‘A is a class which contains at least one member’. 
In other words, in the “technical sense” existence is a second-order 
predicate. The other, nontechnical, sense is, to be sure, ‘the meaning in 
which we inquire whether God exists, in which we affirm that socrates 
existed, and deny that hamlet existed’ (Russell 1905: 486). Now Russell 
not only does not care to present the “technical” sense as providing an 
analysis or clarification of what is meant by ‘exist’ in ‘philosophy and 
ordinary language’; he goes so far as to deny that there is any shared 
meaning here, presenting the duality of senses as an instance of plain 
ambiguity:
The first point in regard to which clearness is essential concerns the 
meaning of the word “existence”. There are two meanings of this 
word as distinct as stocks in a flower-garden and stocks on the stock 
exchange, which yet are continually being confused, or at least supposed 
somehow connected. of these meanings, only one occurs in philosophy 
or in common parlance, and only the other occurs in mathematics or in 
symbolic logic. until it is realized that they have absolutely nothing to do 
with each other, it is quite impossible to have clear ideas on our present 
topic. (Russell 1905: 486, my italics, PF)
This is apt to sound deeply puzzling. when Kant or Frege denied that 
existence was a property of objects, the denial was explicitly offered as 
an explication of the use of ‘exist’ ‘in philosophy and ordinary language’. 
In particular, the language of quantification theory as Frege devised it 
should enable one to express perspicuously (i.e. as “logical” or second-
order predication) what would get misleadingly expressed (in the guise 
of “real” or first-order predication) in ordinary language. Indeed, Russell’s 
startling claim that the two senses have nothing to do with each other 
does not even begin to make sense until we realize that the ontological 
counterpart to that semantical distinction is a distinction between two 
kinds of objects. Thus he notes, commenting on the nontechnical sense P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
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(that in which we deny that hamlet existed): ‘The entities dealt with in 
mathematics do not exist in this sense: the number 2, or the principle 
of the syllogism, are objects which mathematics considers, but which 
certainly form no part of the world of existing things. This sense of 
existence lies wholly outside symbolic logic, which does not care a pin 
whether its entities exist in this sense or not.’ (Ibid.). what symbolic logic 
‘does not care a pin’ for is, to begin with (although, as the remainder of 
the section just quoted makes clear, not exclusively) existence in time. 
Thus Russell adds, now referring to the “technical sense” of ‘exist’: ‘In 
this sense, the class of numbers (e.g.) exists, because 1, 2, 3, etc., are 
members of it; but in sense (a) the class and its members alike do not 
exist: they do not stand out in a part of space and time, nor do they 
have the kind of super-sensible existence which is attributed to the   
deity.’ (Ibid.)
what the distinction may be, if any there is, between ‘the kind of 
super-sensible existence which is attributed to the deity’ and that of 
abstract objects which are not classes, like the  principle of syllogism 
or the logical constants, I will not conjecture here. All I am claiming on 
Russell’s behalf is that there is more to his denial that existence as a 
second-order predicate has anything to do with the ordinary sense of 
‘exist’ than meets the eye. Actually – let that stand as my main claim – if 
anything along the lines of Føllesdal’s “deduction” is on the right track, 
Russell may have seen closer into the truth (if, as usual, through a glass 
darkly) than did either Kant or Frege.
In the years that were to follow the publication of ‘on denoting’, 
the technique of incomplete symbols would be pressed into service 
to dispose of classes, and the extensional approach of ‘The existential 
Import of Propositions’ would give way to the wholly intensional one we 
find Principia Mathematica: existence (in the “technical” sense) is now 
a predicate of propositional functions, and of nothing else.
Russell’s efforts, in the years following the publication of Principia, 
to provide his ‘no-classes’ version of logicism with an epistemological 
foundation  would  notoriously  eventuate,  under  the  influence  of 
wittgenstein’s tenacious insistence in keeping logical analysis free of 
epistemological speculations, in the rediscovery of a metaphysical view 
long before entertained by Plato.9 Nearing the end of the Theaetetus, in a 
famous and endlessly intriguing section, Plato has socrates say, about the 
proposal that being backed by an account (logos) is what distinguishes 
knowledge from mere true judgment:
9  on Plato’s “logical atomism” see Ryle 1990 and mcdowell 1969-70.P. Faria – Existence as a real predicate
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In my dream, I thought I was listening to people saying that the primary 
elements, as it were, of which we and everything else are composed, 
have no account. each of them, in itself, can only be named; it is not 
possible to say anything else of it, either that it is or that it is not. That 
would mean that we were adding being or not being to it; whereas we 
must not attach anything if we are to speak of the thing itself alone. 
Indeed we ought not to apply to it even such words as ‘itself’ or ‘that’, 
‘each’, ‘alone’ or ‘this’, or any other of the many words of this kind, for 
these go the round and are applied to all things alike, being other than 
the things to which they are added, whereas if it were possible to express 
the element itself and it had its own proprietary account, it would have to 
be expressed without any other thing. As it is, however, it is impossible 
that any of the primaries should be expressed in an account; it can only 
be named, for a name is all that it has. but with the things composed of 
these, it is another matter. here, just in the same way as the elements 
themselves are weaved together, so their names may be woven together 
and become an account of something – an account being essentially a 
complex of names.10
In Philosophical Investigations § 46, wittgenstein – here, as elsewhere, 
a much keener and more of a scholarly reader of other philosophers than 
is usually acknowledged – raises the question: ‘but what lies behind the 
idea that names really signify simples?’. And, upon quoting extensively 
– by way of an answer, as it were –  from that section of the Theaetetus, 
he remarks: ‘both Russell’s ‘individuals’ and my ‘objects’ (Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus) were such primary elements.’11
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